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Abstract 
 
 
Objective: Rural emergency departments face unique challenges in maintaining staff preparation 
for pediatric cardiopulmonary arrests, or “codes,” yet federal law creates the expectation that all 
EDs be prepared to manage any and all critically ill patients. Project CAPE is based on the 
hypothesis that it takes as little as one intervention and the provision of self-guided learning tools 
to establish a self-perpetuating educational policy in rural NC emergency departments.    The 
purpose of this study is to determine whether such an intervention demonstrably improves the 
ability to manage pediatric codes in rural EDs; this analysis concerns the initial step of assessing 
pre-intervention provider knowledge, experience, and comfort.  Methods: We gathered data on 
baseline provider skill, comfort, and knowledge at five NC hospitals by online survey. Results: 
Provider knowledge of PALS guidelines is low, regardless of PALS certification.  Providers are 
more comfortable with older pediatric patients than younger patients and have limited exposure 
to pediatric patients and limited experience performing pediatric procedures.  Providers receive 
little ongoing pediatric education but believe they would benefit from pediatric mock code 
training.  Significance: The initial results suggest that providers at rural NC EDs will benefit 
from and are receptive to further pediatric emergency training with mock codes.  This finding is 
supportive of Project CAPE and may have broad public policy implications. 
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Introduction 
 
Cardiopulmonary arrests (CPA) are relatively rare in children.  The expectation that 
medical interventions to reverse a CPA—or any pediatric code—should run perfectly, rarity 
notwithstanding, is often met with disappointment.  Despite advances in medicine and team work 
dynamics aimed at improving pediatric codes, a review of their outcomes is disheartening: 
overall, the immediate survival rate for pediatric CPA may be as low as 13% (Young and Seidel 
1999).  
If providing ideal care in a pediatric code is hampered by rarity, this challenge should be 
all the more evident in small, rural emergency departments (EDs).  A 2006 national telephone 
survey of emergency departments in hospitals with fewer than 100 beds revealed that over half 
of such hospitals have no emergency medicine physicians on staff and only 8.6% have 
pediatricians on call to back up the ED.  However, most of those hospitals reported that at least 
75% of their ED staff maintained current PALS certification (Casey, Wholey, and Moscovice 
2008).  The bulk of small EDs are relying on PALS certification to ensure that their staffs are 
prepared to provide care in the rare event of a pediatric code. 
First published in 1986, the American Heart Association’s  Pediatric Advanced Life 
Support (PALS) guidelines have become the de facto standard of care for pediatric CPA and 
other code situations in the United States (Bardella 1999).  By 2001, fully 99% of American 
medical schools required certification in PALS for their pediatric residents.  ED staff, however, 
are not uniformly required to maintain certification (Quan et al. 2001).   
Even with a PALS-certified staff, small EDs must guard against complacency in the face 
of rarity.  Project CAPE (Critical Access for Pediatric Emergencies) was designed by Drs. 
Jessica Katznelson and William Mills of the UNC Pediatric Emergency Department at the 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill with the hypothesis that it takes as little as one 
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outside training intervention to improve the comfort and skill of a small hospital’s ED staff in 
conducting pediatric resuscitations.  Emergency departments at five rural North Carolina 
hospitals with fewer than 25 beds participated.  Each ED completed a brief pediatric mock code 
scenario administered on site by one of Project CAPE’s principal investigators.  Prior to this 
mock code, providers at each ED completed a survey  their experience with pediatric codes, their 
training for such events, and their comfort and experience performing common pediatric 
procedures (see appendix 1, “Project CAPE Survey”).  Each hospital was then given a pediatric 
patient simulator and agreed to hold mock codes at regular intervals.  Project CAPE seeks to 
improve pediatric emergency skills while tracking this improvement through follow-up 
repetitions of the same survey. 
Existing federal law creates the expectation that all EDs provide care to any critically ill 
patient.  The present research includes an analysis of national policies that dictate the 
expectations of the American emergency department to better understand the policy context of 
interventions like Project CAPE.  The policy analysis is one of national focus, but it provides 
critical context: it is national policy that has created the expectations that Project CAPE is 
attempting to meet.  For a complete discussion federal policy relating to American EDs, see 
appendix 4, “Reforming Emergency.” 
This analysis considers the initial survey data from Project CAPE and the public policy 
implications they suggest.  The data presented here are limited by time; only the initial survey 
was available for analysis.  An evaluation of the efficacy of Project CAPE in toto would be 
premature.  Rather, it is the goal of this analysis to understand project CAPE, its results to date, 
and the political context in which it was created. 
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Survey Methods: Design, Distribution and Analysis 
 
 Project CAPE consists of three main components: mock codes, a team dynamics and 
mock code training seminar at UNC Hospital, and an iterative survey to measure baseline 
provider characteristics and track improvements over time.  The survey assessed four facets of 
the ED staff at five rural NC hospitals: background provider information, existing training and 
certifications, experience and comfort with pediatric patients and pediatric emergency 
procedures, and knowledge of the American Heart Association’s Pediatric Advanced Life 
Support (PALS) guidelines. This analysis is concerned primarily with the design, analysis, and 
results of the initial survey.   
 Project CAPE is funded by the North Carolina Office of Rural Health and Community 
Care and the Cannon Foundation.  The study received a waiver from the University of North 
Carolina’s Institutional Review Board (Biomedical IRB, study number 09-2327). 
 
Survey Content and Design 
A complete copy of the Project CAPE survey as distributed is provided in appendix 1.  
Respondents at participating hospitals completed the survey online, before the initial site visit, 
using Qualtrics survey software (Qualtrics Labs Inc., Provo, UT).  All questions were generated 
by expert consensus among pediatric ED physicians in consultation with an expert in survey 
research design.  The survey was administered and maintained by the first author. 
No individual identifying information was collected, but we did ask each respondent to 
answer three open-ended questions such as, “What city were you born in?” in order to 
anonymously track changes in individual providers’ responses at each iteration of the survey.  
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Initial questions also identified the respondent’s provider type, primary specialty, and years of 
ED experience.   
We asked respondents what, if any, training programs or certifications they had 
completed, such as PALS or Advanced Cardiac Life Support (ACLS) training.  We assessed 
ongoing educational efforts by asking about existing mock codes at the respondent’s hospital, 
availability of continuing education programs, and the degree to which pediatric topics were 
included in such programs.  Providers also rated the overall helpfulness of mock codes and were 
asked if they thought mock codes would improve their skill and comfort with pediatric patients. 
To assess provider experience and comfort with pediatric patients, we asked respondents 
to estimate the number of pediatric patients they treat during a typical ED shift.  They also 
reported the number of times over the past year they had performed several common procedures 
identified by prior work as targets for future improvement in pediatric code performance (see 
Hunt et al. 2006).  Respondents rated their comfort with each procedure in each age group, 
ranging from “not at all comfortable” (0) to “completely comfortable” (100).  Physicians and 
mid-level providers (MLPs)—including physician assistants (PA) and nurse practitioners (NP)—
were asked to rate experience and comfort on the same scale for an additional list of tasks 
specific to these providers. 
 We assessed provider knowledge with six multiple choice questions. All questions were 
consistent with PALS guidelines, and several addressed topics previously identified as targets for 
future pediatric code performance improvement (see Hunt et al. 2006).  We tested the knowledge 
questions for clarity and content in a convenience sample of UNC pediatric emergency 
specialists. 
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 Each of the five participating hospitals designated a point person to distribute the survey 
to the ED staff at his or her hospital.  Surveys remained identifiable at the hospital level, but not 
among individual respondents.  The first round of surveys was distributed to each hospital’s 
point person prior to the initial Project CAPE site visit, and only those surveys completed before 
the first site visit are included in the analysis. 
 
Analysis 
 One hundred and twenty-five completed surveys were available for this initial analysis.  
Nineteen surveys were completed after the time of the initial site visit and were dropped from 
further analysis.  Data were analyzed using Stata version 10 (StataCorp 2007).   
We calculated summary descriptive statistics for each question in total and stratified by 
provider type.  Ten respondents gave no provider type; these responses were included in the 
general analysis, but dropped from any provider type-specific analyses.  The roles and expected 
knowledge of PAs and NPs in this context are similar to those of physicians, so we grouped 
physicians and these mid-level providers for this analysis. 
We created composite variables to measure provider experience and knowledge (see 
appendix 2, “Construction of Composite Variables”).  We assigned each provider an experience 
score for each patient age group based on the number of procedures performed in that age group 
over the past year.  A primary knowledge score comprises only the respondent’s performance on 
the six multiple choice knowledge questions.  We also created a composite knowledge indicator 
that includes knowledge question performance as well as existing certifications, past training 
experiences, and use of continuing education programs with pediatric patients. 
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We created an indicator variable for physician comfort to control for inter-respondent 
variation in comfort reporting. MLP or physician comfort scores represent the deviation in 
providers’ comfort for a given age group from their overall average comfort score (see appendix 
2).  Other respondents rated comfort for infants and children only; these score are reported as 
averages by age group.  
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Initial Results 
Experience & Comfort 
Table 1 provides a summary of baseline characteristics.  Sixty-two nurses, 25 physicians, 
and seven MLPs completed the survey.  Most nurses had completed both PALS and ACLS 
within the past two years (87 and 98%, respectively), but far fewer physicians and MLPs 
completed these courses (47 and 60%, respectively).  Less than a quarter of providers report 
regularly scheduled mock codes or a continuing education program with pediatric focus at their 
hospitals.  
Table 2 lists the proportion of providers who reported performing each procedure 0-5 
times over the past year in each patient age group.  Most respondents had little experience with 
starting IVs, placing NG tubes, or placing urinary catheters in pediatric patients over the past 
year.   
Table 3 shows that experience with intraosseous lines, central lines, bag mask ventilation, 
and intubation is similarly limited among physicians and MLPs; most providers indicated 
performing the listed procedures 0-5 times over the past year. 
Nevertheless, experience performing pediatric procedures is associated with comfort in 
treating pediatric patients. Mean reported comfort for all procedures in all age groups was 55.3 
for providers with experience scores below the 50
th
 percentile and 72.2 for providers at or above 
the median (P < 0.001). 
 
Knowledge 
Figure 1 displays the percent of correct responses to each of the six knowledge questions 
among all providers.  Performance was highest for questions two and three, about Broselow tape 
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use (91% correct) and IO medications (94% correct.)  Performance on the remaining four 
questions was generally poor, ranging from 17% correct (appropriate use of fluid resuscitation 
for a child with suspected sepsis) to 32% correct (first step in care for a patient showing 
ventricular fibrillation).  There was no significant difference in overall performance between 
nurses and physicians/MLPs (45% and 49% correct, respectively; P=0.28), suggesting that all 
members of ED teams can profit from educational interventions. 
 Table 4 lists the mean reported comfort level among all respondents for each procedure 
by age group and by provider type.  In all cases, providers are more comfortable performing 
procedures in children than in infants (P < 0.001).  There is no significant difference, however, in 
comfort scores either for children or infants compared by provider type: P= 0.52, comparing 
nurse and physician comfort with children, and P= 0.84, comparing nurse and physician comfort 
with infants. 
 Table 5 displays mean comfort deviation scores among physicians and MLPs by age 
group.  Mean comfort for all procedures in all age groups—including adults—is 66.9 (out of 
100).  Physicians and MLPs are slightly more comfortable than their baseline performing 
procedures in children, but less comfortable in pediatric patients overall (-5.2), and report 
decreasing comfort with decreasing patient age. 
Figure 2 displays mean comfort ratings reported on a 100 point scale for all procedures in 
both children and infants, stratified by years of ED experience.  While there is an apparent trend 
of increasing comfort with increasing years of experience, these differences were not statistically 
significant (P = 0.089).  In contrast, Figure 3 displays mean comfort for all procedures in 
children only, stratified by years of ED experience.  Considering only children, there is 
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significantly greater comfort with increasing years of experience. 
 
Mock Codes  
We asked several questions tapping providers’ attitudes about the usefulness of mock 
code training and the current amount of pediatric training at their hospital.  These responses are 
summarized in table 6.  Providers overwhelmingly endorse the utility of mock codes in general 
and for improving comfort and skill with pediatric patients.  However, only a minority of 
providers are currently receiving mock code training, and among those who are, few are 
experiencing mock codes with substantial pediatric content. 
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Discussion: Survey, Results, and Policy Implications 
Our data suggest that providers at rural North Carolina hospitals have limited exposure to 
pediatric patients, pediatric procedures, and continuing training in pediatrics.  Physicians are 
substantially less comfortable caring for pediatric patients than they are treating adults, and all 
providers demonstrate a monotonic, declining association of comfort with patient age. While 
most have completed a PALS training course, provider knowledge of PALS guidelines remains 
limited.  Yet by virtue of having an emergency department, public policy demands that these 
providers be prepared to handle critically ill pediatric patients. 
That limited pediatric experience is associated with limited comfort in treating pediatric 
patients argues for the potential of Project CAPE.  Mock codes have become the standard 
training modality for improving code team performance precisely because they can provide 
regular experience with otherwise rare events (Birkhoff and Donner 2009).  
Knowledge of PALS guidelines among our providers is generally low, regardless of years 
of experience or provider type, and despite completing a PALS course.  This is certainly not 
surprising, as existing literature shows that PALS training is effective in making short-term 
improvements in provider knowledge, but long-term knowledge retention is poor (Grant, 
Marczinski, and Menon 2007).  Thus, to be effective, a training intervention must be repeated at 
intervals.  To be practical, it should also be self-perpetuating.  Such is the promise of Project 
CAPE. 
The current study faces several limitations.  Chiefly, this analysis considers only the first 
round of results from a survey instrument that is meant to generate an iterative, longitudinal 
panel study.  Given this intent, the survey was not explicitly designed to detect relationships 
between provider comfort, knowledge, and experience after a single sampling, but rather to 
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assess improvement over time.  Some informative relationships were apparent in this initial data 
set, but the true utility of this survey rests on coming results. 
The survey itself could be refined.  Providers chose from four categories to rate 
procedure experience in the past year.  Because the bulk of respondents reported “0-5” 
procedures, and almost none selected the “more than 20 times” option, these questions could be 
improved by offering more narrowly defined categories focusing on lower ranges.  Non-
physician respondents were asked to rate comfort in only two age groups in an effort to reduce 
the burden of administration for the bulk of respondents.  The reliability of our comfort measure 
could be improved, however, by asking all respondents to rate comfort in all four age groups, as 
was asked of physicians and MLPs. 
Despite these limitations, our results show substantial promise for the future of Project 
CAPE.  Consider again Table 6, “Providers’ Views on Mock Code Training.”  Taken together, 
these responses suggest that although most providers find mock codes helpful and believe 
participating in pediatric mock codes would improve their comfort and skill, the majority are 
getting little or no exposure to pediatric mock codes. Rural ED providers believe in the value of 
mock code training for pediatric patients, but currently, such training is limited.    The goal of 
Project CAPE is to effect a self-perpetuating pediatric code training program.  For such a 
program to work, providers must “buy in,” as ultimately success depends upon their continuing 
participation.  As Table 6 demonstrates, rural ED providers are eager to participate in further 
pediatric training.  Project CAPE is prepared to provide it. 
Project CAPE is intended to improve practice at North Carolina hospitals, but it is 
addressing a need for excellent pediatric care created by national policy.  The Emergency 
Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA) of 1986 was designed to ensure treatment 
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for critically ill patients regardless of their capacity to pay (Lee 2002).  However, it has also 
created the expectation that EDs will be ready to provide critical care for any and all patients 
who come through the door, regardless of age or the rarity with which the ED sees such patients.  
Despite this expectation, formal completion of a PALS course is generally not required of 
physicians outside of pediatric specialties (Bardella 1999).  Further, as our results suggest, PALS 
certification alone is insufficient to guarantee high quality pediatric code care in EDs that rarely 
treat critically ill children.   
The result, unsurprisingly, is significant variation in pediatrics survival after a code 
depending on hospital characteristics.  A 2006 report generated from the National Registry of 
Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation found significant positive correlations between improved 24 
hour survival and receiving care at a hospital staffed by pediatric residents and pediatrics 
surgeons (Donoghue et al. 2006).  That outcomes are best among those providers most likely to 
have hands-on experience managing pediatric CPA argues favorably for the wider dissemination 
of pediatric code simulation training. 
Complicating matters further, the expectations for EDs created by policy at the national 
level come without financial support to help realize them.  The result is tension between small 
hospitals’ legal—and perhaps moral—obligation to prepare for pediatric codes despite their 
rarity, and those hospitals’ very real concern for their own bottom lines.  Thus, while most 
hospitals with fewer than 100 beds in America require at least a portion of their ED staffs to 
maintain PALS certification, fewer than half of these hospitals provide the necessary training on 
site (Casey, Wholey, and Moscovice 2008). 
Project CAPE is surely not a replacement for PALS certification.  Rather, it is meant to 
augment formal training by allowing providers to routinely practice what they have learned.  
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PALS training has been shown to be effective for improving provider performance in pediatric 
mock codes, but knowledge and skill decay quickly after training (Grant, Marczinski, and Menon 
2007).  Hunt et al. have demonstrated that a single pediatric mock code followed by an 
educational intervention leads to improved mock code performance in ED staff after six months 
(2007).  Project CAPE includes a similar intervention, with an additional focus on establishing a 
policy of regularly scheduled mock codes within each participating ED. 
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Conclusion 
Project CAPE has the potential to be not only a training tool for small EDs, but also a 
realistic policy tool to help relieve the tension between financial realities and federal 
expectations.  It is a relatively inexpensive intervention, requiring a one-time investment in a 
pediatric patient simulator.  Thereafter, it becomes a matter of EDs’ systematically choosing to 
hold pediatric mock codes in accordance with Project CAPE’s schedule.  Implementing Project 
CAPE, then, represents more of a shift in department or hospital policy than a significant 
financial investment in training hospital staff.   
Our intention is to demonstrate that such a policy shift effectively improves providers’ 
pediatric code comfort and knowledge at a department level.  The initial results are promising in 
that they indicate a desire among providers to participate with a new training policy.  Should this 
policy shift prove to effectively improve PALS knowledge and comfort with pediatric code 
procedures, we will consider Project CAPE a success.  But we may have also found an 
appropriate model for future public policy initiatives aimed at redressing the discordance 
between the expectations for EDs set at the federal level and the practical realities that hamper 
their achievement.   
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Tables & Figures 
 
 
Table1 
Summary Characteristics in Total Sample and by Provider Type 
 
 
% or mean (n) 
 All Respondents RN MD/MLP 
Provider Type 
 
61% (62) 34% (32) 
EM is primary specialty 
  
63% (19) 
≥ 5 years of ED experience 63% (64) 24% (39) 75% (24) 
>10 Years of ED experience 39% (39) 34% (21) 53% (17) 
Completed PALS course in last 2 years 72% (73) 87% (54) 47% (15) 
Completed ACLS course in last 2 years 84% (85) 98% (61) 60% (15) 
Hospital has  scheduled mock codes 19% (19) 44% (14) 9% (3) 
Hospital offers continuing education 
program with ≥ 25% pediatric focus 19% (18) 18% (11) 16% (5) 
Pediatric patients seen per shift 8.4 (93) 8.6 (58) 7.8 (31) 
Toddlers seen per shift 4.6 (92) 4.8 (57) 4.5 (31) 
Infants  seen per shift 2.2 (92) 2.5 (57) 1.8 (31) 
SOURCE:  Project CAPE on-line survey, conducted by the investigators. 
 
Note:  “MD/MLP” (mid-level provider) includes physicians, physician assistants, and nurse 
practitioners. Ten respondents listed no provider type; these responses are counted among “all 
respondents” but were not included in calculations by provider type. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Experience Among All Providers With Three Procedures, by Age Group of Patient 
 
 
 
% of all providers reporting 0-5 procedures 
over last year (n=97) 
 In Infants In Toddlers In Children 
Start IV 79% 66% 55% 
Place NG 100% 99% 97% 
Place urinary catheter 86% 82% 85% 
SOURCE:  Project CAPE on-line survey, conducted by the investigators. 
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Table 3 
Experience Among MDs & MLPs with Four Procedures, by Age Group of Patient 
 
 
% of MD/MLPs reporting 0-5 procedures 
over last year (n=30) 
 In Infants In Toddlers In Children 
Start IO 100% 100% 100% 
Place Central Line 100% 100% 100% 
Bag Mask Ventilate 97% 97% 97% 
Intubate 93% 97% 97% 
 SOURCE:  Project CAPE on-line survey, conducted by the investigators. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 
Comfort Among All Providers with Six Procedures, by Age Group of Patient 
 
 
Mean (sd) comfort score on a 0-100 point scale 
 
 All Providers (n=97) RN (n=61) MD/MLP (n=29) 
  Children Infants Children Infants Children Infants 
Assessing Patient 80 (22.7) 72 (27.9) 77 (23.7) 69 (29.6) 91 (10.6) 85 (15.3) 
Drawing Blood 62 (32.0) 50 (34.8) 71 (29.7) 59 (33.7) 51 (30.4) 39 (33.2) 
Placing an IV 62 (33.0) 49 (43.9) 73 (28.7) 59 (33.5) 44 (31.0) 35 (32.2) 
Placing an NG 52 (33.1) 46 (35.4) 51 (32.5) 43 (35.7) 63 (31.5) 61 (30.9) 
Placing a Urinary Catheter 66 (29.6) 56 (32.0) 68 (30.3) 55 (33.8) 65 (27.1) 63 (28.7) 
Recognizing Abnormal Vitals 82 (22.0) 78 (26.4) 81 (21.5) 76 (27.6) 89 (16.7) 85 (19.0) 
Column Mean 
67 (24.4) 59 (26.0) 70 (25.0) 60 (27.8) 67 (20.4) 61 (21.0) 
(P < 0.001) (P < 0.001) (P < 0.001) 
 
SOURCE:  Project CAPE on-line survey, conducted by the investigators. 
 
Note: Comfort was reported on a 100 point scale using adjustable sliders. Zero was defined as 
“not at all comfortable;” 100 was defined as “completely comfortable.”  Column means 
compared with two-sample tests.  
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Table 5 
Comfort and Comfort Deviation by Age Group Among MD/MLPs  
 
  
Mean Comfort (sd) or Deviation from 
Baseline (n=29) 
Baseline Comfort 66.9 (21.0) 
Comfort Deviation, Children 0.44 (4.6) 
Comfort Deviation, Toddlers -5.9 (3.5) 
Comfort Deviation, Infants -10.2 (5.8) 
Comfort Deviation, All Peds  
Patients -5.2 (3.2) 
 SOURCE:  Project CAPE on-line survey, conducted by the investigators. 
 
Note: P < 0.001 for two sample t tests comparing each pair of comfort deviation scores.   
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 
Providers’ Views on Mock Code Training 
 
  
% Agreeing or 
Mean* 
How helpful are mock codes? 
 Very Useful 24% 
At least somewhat useful 73% 
Somewhat useless or less 12% 
Pediatric mock codes would improve  skill 94% 
Pediatric mock codes would improve  comfort 92% 
Pediatric focus hospital's CE program is inadequate 71% 
Hospital has no regularly scheduled mock codes 81% 
Expected benefit from further pediatric training (0-100) *87 
 SOURCE:  Project CAPE on-line survey, conducted by the investigators. 
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Figure 1 
Percent of Correct Responses to Six Knowledge Questions Among All Providers  
 
SOURCE:  Project CAPE on-line survey, conducted by the investigators. 
Note: Response rate varied by question; n = 94, 95, 95, 90, and 92 respectively.  Bar labels refer 
to question topic.  See Appendix 1, “CAPE Survey,” for a complete list of questions and answer 
choices. 
 
Figure 2 
Mean Comfort Among All Providers with All Procedures in Infants and Children  
 
SOURCE:  Project CAPE on-line survey, conducted by the investigators. 
Note: Providers rated comfort with six tasks in two age groups from 0-100.  Bar height 
represents mean comfort for all procedures in both age groups.  Comparison of means based on 
one-way analysis of variance; P=0.089.  
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Figure 3 
Mean Comfort Among All Providers with All Procedures in Children Only  
 
 
SOURCE:  Project CAPE on-line survey, conducted by the investigators. 
Note: Providers rated comfort with six tasks in two age groups from 0-100.  Bar height 
represents mean comfort for all procedures in children only.  Comparison of means based on 
one-way analysis of variance; P=0.05. 
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Appendix 1:  CAPE Survey 
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Appendix 2 
 Construction of Composite Variables 
 
Knowledge Scores: Two Indicators 
 
Each respondent received two knowledge scores. 
 
A primary knowledge score comprised simply of the proportion of multiple choice knowledge 
questions answered correctly, expressed on a continuous scale from 0-1. 
 
The composite knowledge indicator was constructed by awarding points to respondents for 
relevant background educational experiences as well as their performance on the knowledge 
questions, creating a final composite score ranging from 0-10.   
 
We assigned one point for each of the following to construct the composite knowledge score: 
 Current PALS certification  
 Current ACLS certification  
 Certified as PALS instructor 
 Certified as ACLS instructor 
 Hospital has a continuing education program with at least 51% focus on pediatric patients  
 Attended an outside educational program that included pediatric patients in the past two 
years 
 Hospital has scheduled mock codes at least twice a year using at least 25% pediatric 
scenarios 
Additionally, 0-3 points were awarded for knowledge question performance: 
 At least one correct question, primary score < 50% correct        one point 
 Primary score between 50-75% correct                                       two points 
 Primary score >75% correct                                                         three points 
 
Experience Scores 
 
Example experience question: 
 
 
We assessed experience in all providers with each of the following procedures: 
 Starting an IV 
 Placing an NG tube 
 Placing a bladder catheter 
32 
 
Physicians and mid-level providers were also asked about the following additional procedures: 
 Starting an IO line 
 Placing a central line 
 Bag mask ventilation 
 Intubation 
Experience scores were calculated based on the number of times a procedure was performed in 
the past year: 
 0-5 times in past year  zero points 
 6-10 times in the past year      one point 
 11-20 times in the past year    two points 
 >20 times in the past year       three points 
Respondents were asked to estimate experience in each of the following age groups: 
 “Infants less than one year” (infants) 
 “Children 1-5” (toddlers) 
 “Children >5” (children) 
 “Adults 18 and older” (adults) 
The final experience score in each age group ranged from 0-9 points among all providers, and 0-
21 for physicians and mid-level providers. 
For analyses considering experience in all pediatric patients, we used the mean of each 
respondent’s infant, toddler, and child scores. 
 
Comfort Scores 
Example comfort question: 
 
 
We constructed separate comfort scores based on provider type.   
All respondents rated their comfort with the following list of procedures for both children and 
infants.  The scale was set from 0-100, with a score of zero defined as “Not at all comfortable,” 
and a score of 100 defined as “Completely comfortable.” 
Tasks rated for comfort by all respondents: 
 Assessing a patient (child or infant) 
 Drawing blood 
 Placing an IV 
 Placing an NG tube 
 Placing a bladder catheter 
 Recognizing abnormal vital signs 
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These responses were used to calculate a mean comfort score for each provider in both children 
and infants. 
 
Physicians and mid-level providers were additionally asked to rate their comfort with the 
following procedures in four age groups, infant, children, toddlers, and adults: 
 Obtaining IV access 
 Obtaining IO access 
 Placing a central line 
 Bag mask ventilation 
 Intubation 
Because these comfort questions included not only pediatric patients but also comfort ratings for 
performing the procedures in adults, we were able to calculate an overall average comfort score, 
from 0-100, for each physician or MLP.   
 
We created comfort deviation scores for physicians and MLPs to assess the degree to which 
provider comfort in performing pediatric tasks differed from baseline comfort.  Using the overall 
comfort score as a baseline, physician and MLP comfort deviation for each age group was 
calculated by subtracting each provider’s mean comfort score for a given age group from that 
provider’s baseline comfort score.  Thus, negative comfort scores indicate relatively less comfort 
in the given age group than the baseline, while positive scores indicate relatively greater comfort 
than the respondent’s baseline. 
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Appendix 3 
 
Prior to CAPE: A Systematic Review of the Literature 
 
The Pediatric Advanced Life Support (PALS) guidelines published by the American 
Heart Association (AHA) have become the de facto standard of care for pediatric resuscitations 
(Bardella 1999).  Improving performance within that guideline is the standard of achievement 
used in Project CAPE.   
“Codes” are among the most complicated and fast-passed types of health care.  The 
mounting complexity of emergency medical intervention is further complicated by its demand 
for multidisciplinary team action (Birkhoff and Donner 2010).  Simulated “mock” codes have, 
therefore, been widely accepted as the ideal training modality to prepare health care providers for 
these critical, high-stress encounters in a low risk environment conducive to practice and 
learning (Hunt et al. 2006).  The studies reviewed here consider mock codes as training tools for 
real-life pediatric codes. 
 
Systematic Review 
This review begins with a question: what have programs attempting to use mock codes 
for training within the PALS guidelines accomplished to date?  I searched PubMed on April 1, 
2011 using the terms “Pediatric Advanced Life Support” AND “education OR Training” to 
capture published studies using the PALS guidelines for training or educational purposes.  PALS 
was last updated in 2005; therefore, I limited the search to studies published in the last five years.   
I also limited the search to studies published in English, using human subjects, and those with 
available abstracts.  This initial search yielded 20 results.  I printed and reviewed abstracts for all 
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20 findings to assess their relevance to understanding the proposed training interventions in 
Project CAPE. 
I dropped several studies from further review after assessing their abstracts.  Five of the 
initial 20 abstracts concerned neither existing nor novel training interventions related to PALS 
guidelines.  Two abstracts considered the effects of using cognitive aids during a code scenario, 
but not the effects of training.  One abstract limited its assessment to the performance of single 
pediatric emergency procedure (tracheal intubation).  Two studies considered electronic training 
programs which, though promising, are outside of the scope of this review.  Three studies 
characterized the state of current PALS training requirements in various settings; these studies 
are referenced in this paper’s introduction but are outside of the scope of the systematic review.  
Finally, one abstract considered the effects of PALS training in EMS workers in a pre-hospital 
setting.  In total, 14 of the initial 20 studies were dropped from further review. 
I reviewed the remaining six studies in full.  After review, the studies were grouped into 
one of three categories.  Three studies assessed the value of high-fidelity simulators capable of 
mechanically reproducing physical findings in a PALS training context.  One study considered a 
standardized measurement tool for assessing provider performance in code scenarios.  Finally, 
two studies evaluated a novel training intervention to improve pediatric code team performance.  
The findings from each of these studies are presented below, organized by category.  Each 
category ends with an overall assessment of the contribution of that category and its relevance to 
Project CAPE.  Table 1 summarizes each study’s main findings, overall internal validity and 
generalizability, and potential contribution to Project CAPE. 
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High-Fidelity Simulators for Pediatric Mock Codes. 
Birkhoff and Donner (2010) combine a review of the published literature and a 
qualitative analysis of a PALS curriculum with an integrated high-fidelity simulation component 
at one pediatric academic medical center in Pennsylvania.  Participants comprised potential 
PALS providers with varying professional backgrounds who participated in a PALS course with 
high-fidelity simulators.  Twenty-three participants responded to eight short answer questions 
about personal demographic information, perceptions of the simulation, and thoughts on 
comparing the enhanced simulators to previous, traditional PALS courses.  The authors 
evaluated these open-ended responses and summarize recurring themes. 
From their literature review, Birkhoff and Donner conclude that high-fidelity simulators 
are more beneficial than traditional simulators for pediatric mock codes.  However, they note that 
the magnitude of this difference is difficult to assess in the current literature due to inconsistent 
study designs and outcomes measures.  From their own survey, the authors conclude that most 
participants found simulator realism and rotating through multiple rolls during the simulation to 
be the most helpful parts of the course. 
The qualitative nature of this study allows the conclusion that participants may like high 
fidelity simulators more than traditional PALS courses, but does not allow any quantification of 
this preference.   The participants were drawn from two institutions in an effort to maximize 
opportunities to improve communication and team work dynamics.  Participants reported a 
perceived benefit in this arrangement, but again there is little presented here that would allow an 
analysis of the magnitude of this effect.   This study was conducted with a variety of medical 
professionals, drawn from large academic medical institutions, and so the results are 
generalizable to PALS training in most contexts.  The main finding—that participants prefer 
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high-fidelity simulators and team work in PALS courses—is consistent with extant literature, 
and I can find no reason to argue against generalizing this conclusion to most PALS training 
situations.  However, the magnitude and importance of these preferences remains unclear. 
 
In a non-blinded, controlled trial, Donoghue, Durbin, Nadel, Stryjewski, Kost, and 
Nadkarni (2010) sought to determine how the use of high-fidelity simulators would affect mock 
code participants’ perception of realism.  All first or second year pediatric residents from three 
academic medical centers were invited to participate; 51 residents responded and completed the 
study.   All subjects participated in four mock code scenarios, followed by a one-on-one teaching 
session with one of the study’s principal investigators, followed by two additional mock code 
scenarios.  Half of the participants were randomly assigned to mock codes using high-fidelity 
simulators; the remaining participants had the high-fidelity features of their mannequins 
disabled.  Participants were then asked to rate the realism of the code experience on a five point 
Likert scale.  Those who had used the high fidelity mannequins were further asked to rate the 
realism of the eight physical findings that the mannequins were designed to simulate. 
Among the high-fidelity group, the ability to palpate a pulse in the mannequin was rated 
as the most important simulated physical findings.  Only the mock code scenarios involving 
asystole and pulseless ventricular tachycardia were statistically different in realism scores 
between groups.  While the high-fidelity group did rate the experience as more realistic when 
averaged across all scenarios, the difference was small; mean realism on a scale of 1-5 was 3.7 
for the traditional group and 4.0 for the high-fidelity group ( P = 0.04).  The authors conclude 
that high-fidelity simulation is potentially beneficial when integrated into PALS courses, 
especially in terms of certain physical features such as the ability to palpate a pulse. 
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However, the magnitude of this effect was small; both groups of residents rated the 
realism of their mock code experience highly, with the high-fidelity group rating realism only 
slightly higher.  Most scenarios, taken individually, revealed no difference in realism scores 
between groups.  The two scenarios that did reveal a difference in perceived realism between 
groups found only a small difference.  In both scenarios showing a difference in realism, the 
mean scores were 3.75 for the traditional group and 4.0 for the high-fidelity group (P = 0.04) on 
a five point scale.  
 This study presents several concerns, both in terms of its internal validity and its 
generalizability. The participants were not blinded to their group allocations.  Those who 
experienced high-fidelity simulation were aware they were using enhanced simulators.  Because 
the magnitude of the difference in realism scores between groups was small to begin with, this 
lack of blinding could account for the difference between groups.  Further, realism was rated 
here by junior residents who are likely to have limited clinical exposure to code scenarios.  With 
more experience with real-world code scenarios, participants may rate the realism of simulators 
differently.  Participants rated only their perceived realism, with no attempt to quantify how that 
realism may have translated into improved performance in executing the PALS algorithms.  With 
these limitations in mind, it is difficult to generalize the findings presented here to PALS training 
in general. 
 
The authors of the above study also published an analysis of the same data, considering 
the effect of high-fidelity simulation on trainee cognitive performance in adhering to PALS 
algorithms (Donoghue et al. 2009).  Again, 51 residents participated, each completing four mock 
code scenarios, a one-on-one didactic session, and finally two additional mock code scenarios in 
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which the participant’s performance was scored.  Cognitive assessment consisted of awarding 
zero to two points for each “critical task” in the assessment mock codes.  Scoring was completed 
by expert consensus after pediatric emergency department faculty reviewed video recordings of 
the trainees’ performance.  Participants were randomly assigned without blinding to high-fidelity 
and traditional simulator groups.  The high-fidelity group had the relevant simulated physical 
findings demonstrated to them during the didactic session, before the cognitive assessment. 
Among both groups, mean cognitive assessment scores improved after the didactic 
session; the high-fidelity group’s mean score improved slightly more than the traditional group, 
but the difference was not statistically significant.  However, mixed modeling analysis revealed a 
statistically significant difference in the amount of change between groups.  Using this model of 
amount of change, the authors report that the traditional and high-fidelity groups improved their 
scores by 4.8 points and 11.1 points, respectively (P < 0.001) on a 100 point scale. 
The present study faces several limitations.  Most importantly, the difference in mean 
cognitive scores between groups was not statistically significant.   A significant effect was 
revealed only with the use of mixed modeling to account for within-subject covariance.  This 
difference, though statistically significant, is quite small and unlikely to represent a meaningful 
difference in terms of selecting training modalities for future PALS courses.  Notably, the high-
fidelity group was explicitly shown the relevant physical findings during their didactic sessions, 
prompting one to wonder if that group actually learned more as a result of a better simulation or 
if they were simply better prepared to interpret physical finding cues within the context of a 
mock code.  Even setting concerns for validity aside, the effect of high-fidelity simulators 
demonstrated here seems too small to warrant much argument in favor of their use in general. 
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Taken together, the above studies of high-fidelity simulation in PALS training suggest 
promise in this modality, though that promise may not yet be fully realized or adequately proven.  
Birkhoff and Donner (2010) convincingly demonstrate that participants from a wide range of 
professional backgrounds prefer high-fidelity simulation to traditional mock codes.  The two 
studies by Donoghue et al. (2009, 2010) demonstrate small improvements in participant-rated 
realism and acquisition of cognitive PALS objectives using high-fidelity simulators compared to 
traditional mock codes.  These findings may be generalizable to most PALS training contexts, 
but even so, the magnitude of the effects reported here are too small to make convincing 
arguments to change current practice.  Nevertheless, these studies provide valuable insight into 
avenues for future research regarding the use of high-fidelity simulation to improve the utility of 
pediatric mock codes. 
Project CAPE relies on standard, “low-fidelity” mannequins.  For now, the evidence 
seems to suggest that the benefit, if any, of high-fidelity simulators is small.  Given that its 
ultimate objective is to improve pediatric code team performance in small hospitals state-wide, 
Project CAPE must be easily implemented in many small hospitals.  The potential benefit of 
high-fidelity simulation must be balanced against the additional costs associated with purchasing, 
maintaining, and using high-fidelity simulators.  In light of the evidence presented here, the 
added utility of high-fidelity simulators seems unlikely to outweigh the additional costs they 
present to interventions like Project CAPE.  
 
Mock Code Performance: Standardized Tools for Measurement. 
Measurement implies definition; the definition of quality health care hinges on both 
outcome and process.  In the case of pediatric resuscitation, when patient outcomes differ so 
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fundamentally as “alive” or “dead,” it is tempting to assume a shared definition of quality; but 
some patients survive poorly run codes just as surely as others die in the midst of medical 
excellence.  Thus, measuring quality must also include some comparison of the care delivered to 
the care our best evidence suggests is ideal.  The following study attempted to validate 
standardized scoring algorithms to assess student or trainee code performance in simulated 
pediatric codes.   
Donoghue, Nishisaki, Sutton, Hales, and Boulet (2010) developed scoring rubrics for 
four simulated pediatric code scenarios based on the PALS guidelines.  The team created the 
rubrics by expert consensus.  The authors generated a list of essential tasks for each code 
scenario.  Each task could earn the trainee from zero to two points.  Generally, two points were 
awarded for performing the correct task at the correct time, one point was awarded for 
performing the correct task but at the wrong time, and no points were awarded for performing 
the task at a point in the simulation where it was no longer relevant or failing to perform the task 
at all. 
Twenty-one first and second year pediatric residents from three academic medical centers 
were selected from a larger ongoing study; this was a convenience sample, based on selecting 
participants from the larger study for whom complete audio and visual recordings of their 
simulated code performances were available.  Participants’ tapes were independently reviewed 
by four raters and scored according to an explicit rubric.  Each rater was a certified PALS 
instructor and certified simulation facilitator.  The authors then analyzed the scores by trainee 
year; a fully-crossed G study (crossing trainee, scenario, and rater) was performed to determine 
the degree to which each of these factors contributed to the overall variance.  
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The authors report a statistically significant difference in mean scores by trainee year, 
with second year residents out-performing junior residents (P < 0.05).  This finding suggests that 
the scoring instrument detected the anticipated difference in performance between first and 
second year trainees, which argues for the validity of the instrument.  The G study revealed that 
of the total variation among scores, 16.9% stemmed from differences in individual trainees, 1.5% 
from the person scoring their performance, and 12.8% from the scenario itself.  Thus, most of the 
variation in scores came from the individual trainee, as would be expected if the scoring rubric 
was truly measuring individual performance. Taken together, these results suggest that the 
authors’ scoring rubric is a valid and reliable measure of trainee performance in the selected code 
simulations. 
The internal validity of the study is sufficient to accept the results reported here at face 
value.  It is worth considering, however, that the residents used to test the rubric in this study 
were drawn as a convenience sample from a larger study population; the authors do not assess 
how this convenience sample may have influenced the results or any efforts that they may have 
made to control for this effect.  That the scoring rubric was developed by expert consensus alone 
may also present some concerns, but in light of the analysis presented here, it is likely that expert 
consensus was sufficient.  Despite these limitations, the authors present an overall valid 
assessment of their scoring rubric.  
However, any such metric must also perform outside of the controlled environment of the 
present study in order to be valuable to pediatric code training efforts in general.  It remains 
unclear how well the metric would perform in other hospitals, where the raters are unlikely to be 
PALS certified instructors with extensive simulation experience.  The low degree of inter-
observer variability reported here (r = 0.82) may be due to the scoring rubric itself; however, the 
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extensive expertise of the raters may contribute as well.  Without knowing if the validity of the 
scoring rubric was due to expert raters and not the rubric itself, it is difficult to generalize its 
validity to settings without expert raters. 
 
This study suggests that a scoring guideline can be developed that accurately and reliably 
measures trainee performance in mock codes.  It is not the aim of Project CAPE to measure 
mock code performance; rather, it seeks to increase the exposure of hospital staff to this training 
modality.  However, future assessments of the success or failure of Project CAPE and other 
training interventions may well depend on standardized measurements of mock code 
performance.  Future iterations of Project CAPE or similar programs may have much to gain 
from the insights generated here. 
 
 
Novel Training Interventions for PALS Guidelines. 
Two studies investigated the effects of a novel training intervention designed to improve 
provider performance in pediatric emergency care using mock code simulations.  The first 
considered mock code training in a pediatric outpatient office setting.  While this study initially 
seems out of place in this review due to its setting, it is included here because of its overall 
similarities to Project CAPE.  The second study is even more similar to project CAPE, as it is set 
in a random sample of North Carolina emergency departments.   
 
Toback, Fiedor, Kilpela, and Reis (2006) published the results of an office-based 
pediatric mock code training program.  Eleven pediatric offices in southwestern Pennsylvania 
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were invited to participate.  The authors conducted a two step intervention, consisting of a 
didactic session followed by a mock code training scenario.  Each office was given a pediatric 
mannequin and a manual of mock code scenarios to encourage further self-directed training.  
Participants were surveyed before and after the intervention to ascertain pre- and post-training 
confidence and comfort with specific pediatric code skills.  The offices were also contacted one 
year after the intervention by telephone to ascertain what improvements in office procedure and 
protocol related to pediatric emergencies had been made as a result of the intervention. 
The authors analyzed their data by dividing the participants into two groups.  Group one 
comprised doctors, nurse practitioners, and physician assistants.  Group two included registered 
nurses, licensed practical nurses, and medical assistants.  Reported confidence in performing 
emergency tasks covered in the mock code intervention improved significantly in both groups.  
Further, group one reported increased confidence in placing IO lines (24% vs. 39%, P = 0.003), 
and group two reported increased confidence in administering oxygen (65% vs. 84%, P < 0.001).  
At one year follow up, 18% of practices reported conducting at least one additional mock code. 
While these results are applicable only to the outpatient setting, they do suggest that 
provider comfort and confidence can be improved by a single training intervention.  That the 
majority of offices opted not to perform additional mock codes may suggest that leaving material 
for further self-practice after a single training intervention is not helpful.  However, this finding 
is only relevant for the outpatient setting, as it is likely that pediatric offices feel much less 
pressure to maintain preparedness for emergency care than emergency departments in general.   
 
Hunt, Heine, Hohenhaus, Luo, and Frush (2007) assessed a similar single-intervention 
pediatric code training program conducted in a sample of North Carolina emergency 
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departments.  In this prospective, pre- and post-intervention analysis, 18 randomly selected 
emergency departments participated in an unannounced pediatric mock code, an educational 
intervention, and an additional unannounced follow up mock code six months later.  All mock 
codes were evaluated using a previously presented, 44 item task list.  Task performance was 
rated on a scale of 1-5; these scores were dichotomized in the final analysis to “passing” (score 4 
or 5) and “failing” (score < 4) scores.  Over half of the mock codes were rated independently by 
two observers to ensure interrater reliability.   
All provider types, regardless of previous training or specialty, were invited to 
participate; any staff member who would have been involved had the code scenario happened in 
reality was eligible to participate.  The intervention consisted of three components: the 
simulation exercise, the clinical assessment tool for scoring code team performance, and the 
educational intervention.  The educational intervention was based on both Advanced Trauma 
Life Support (ATLS) and PALS guidelines, focusing on certain pediatric emergency skills that 
had proven particularly troublesome in previous related studies (see Hunt et al. 2006).  Following 
the intervention, each team was given a Broselow tape, a manual for the use and organization of 
color-coded pediatrics emergency equipment and drugs, and an inventory list of items that 
should be kept on hand by any ED in preparation for providing pediatric emergency care. 
The mean number of tasks rated at a passing level increased from 17.7% before the 
intervention to 26.6% after the intervention (P < 0.001). The authors also considered the results 
at the individual task level and report significant improvement in 11 out of 44 tasks tested.  
Finally, the authors note that certain tasks did not improve after the intervention.  Tasks for 
which fewer than half of emergency departments earned passing marks both before and after the 
intervention came from several categories, including neurologic assessment, proper patient 
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exposure and warming measures, the secondary survey exam, and appropriate fluid and dextrose 
administration based on weight. 
The study had several limitations, some of which the authors addressed.  The study was 
not controlled, so it is impossible to know which of the intervention components contributed to 
the overall improvement.  Scorers were not blinded, and may have been biased to show greater 
scores at the six-month follow up code.  A portion of the mock codes were rated independently, 
allowing the authors to calculate a kappa statistic for interrater reliability (k=0.80, 95% CI 0.76, 
0.84), which they argue can be taken as evidence that there was no rater bias at the six month 
follow up.  However, while high interrater reliability may represent a lack of experimenter’s 
bias, it may also simply represent similar levels of bias in the two raters.  The authors do no 
explain why they opted to dichotomize their task scores.  Had they left the original 1-5 scale 
intact and analyzed the results using a multiple linear regression model instead of two sample t-
tests, they may have uncovered other significant effects from the intervention.  But the choice to 
dichotomize the scores is unlikely to create a significant effect where none existed otherwise, 
and so while it may have limited the results, it does not cast doubt on the findings presented here. 
Overall, these findings suggest that a single training intervention can improve provider 
skill in pediatric mock code scenarios.  Because the study comprised a random sample of 
hospitals, including both community hospitals and trauma centers, the results are highly 
generalizable.  However, that only 11 out of 44 measured skills improved significantly suggests 
room for improvement in the training intervention.  Nevertheless, this prospective study of a 
novel training intervention suggests promise for similar single-intervention training programs in 
the future, such as Project CAPE. 
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Together, these two studies of single-intervention educational programs provide valuable 
insight into the challenge and promise of mock code training programs that seek to improve 
provider performance and comfort in conducting pediatric codes, such as Project CAPE.  Toback 
et al. (2006) show the potential of a single intervention to create a self-perpetuating educational 
program, which is the central goal of Project CAPE.  Hunt et al. (2007) demonstrate that such 
single-intervention programs can be effective in a variety of emergency department settings, a 
similarly critical goal of Project CAPE. 
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 Summary of Literature Reviewed 
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page numbering spot] 
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Appendix 4 
 
Reforming Emergency:  
How EMTALA Shaped the American Emergency Department 
 
 
Project CAPE is at its core an educational intervention.  But it is also an intervention in policy 
at the hospital level to create a self-perpetuating educational program.  The Emergency Medical 
Treatment and Active Labor Act represents public policy at the national level that has deeply 
affected American emergency departments.  Project CAPE, seen not just as an educational tool 
but also as a potential public policy tool, exists in some part as a reaction to this national policy.  
The following analysis of the policies surround emergency department care provides critical 
context for understanding the need for—and potential future of—interventions like Project 
CAPE. 
 
 
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) is America’s latest move 
towards universal health care.  The social and economic motives driving reform are powerful, 
but they are not new.  The most basic universal care was meant to be guaranteed by laws 
governing our emergency departments dating back over sixty years ago.  The Hill-Burton Act 
proved fraught with loop holes and logistic challenges, but it laid the groundwork for the 
Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA).   EMTALA established a de 
facto right to emergency health care, codifying in law what one can only assume to be a plain 
moral imperative: no one, regardless of ability to pay, should be left for dead at the doorstep of 
an American hospital.  But establishing a legal right to emergency care is wholly distinct from 
creating the institutional structures to provide it. The ensuing collision between the right to care 
implied by EMTALA and the fiscal realities governing that care in the American emergency 
department left both providers and patients in a fog of financial, legal, and moral ambiguity. 
 
The history of EMTALA is rooted in policy first imagined over half a century ago.  The 
law itself has been defined and redefined by regulatory agencies and an ever-growing body of 
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case law since its passage in the mid 1980s.  Now, with the passage of PPACA, our 
understanding of emergency care and the laws surrounding its delivery will be challenged again.  
How President Obama’s reform will reshape the roll of emergency departments remains to be 
seen.  Understanding this change begins with an understanding of how EMTALA created the 
emergency department as a safety net—albeit rife with holes—for critical health care in the U.S.  
This analysis does not attempt to advocate for a particular policy or approach to American health 
care.  Rather, it seeks to understand the emergency department as we have created it by 
understanding the political process from which is came.  Seen through the lens of political 
theory, the history of emergency health care policy provides a framework for understanding the 
potential and peril that PPACA presents to the American emergency department. 
Backdrop  
The first half of the twentieth century bore witness to the beginnings of an ongoing trend 
in health care: new treatments created the promise of modern medicine, and along with that 
promise came growing costs.  As hospitals faced the reality of increasing costs, the unsavory 
practice of “patient dumping” was born.  Patients who could not pay began to be shuffled from 
hospital to hospital, each institution hoping that care would be provided on someone else’s dime 
(Kamoie 2004).  Some states tried to address the problem by holding hospitals to a common law 
standard, an “…affirmative duty on the part of public hospitals to provide emergency treatment 
to patients without regard to ability to pay” (Lee 2002).    But with no common definition of 
“emergency” and an unwillingness on the part of the states to hold hospitals to the lose standards 
implied by common law, the poorest patients saw little relief from rampant dumping (Lee 2002). 
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The Process of Reform 
A First Pass: The Hill-Burton Act 
As patient dumping grew more frequent despite the common law standard, notions of a 
federal law to end the patient shuffle gained traction in Washington.  In 1946, Congress passed 
the Hill-Burton Act, which provided federal funds for the construction of public hospitals 
(Rosenbaum and Kamoie 2003).  The act required any hospital that received federal funds for its 
construction or renovation to provide basic emergency treatment and ensure a patient was 
medically stable before discharge, regardless of that patient’s ability to pay (Rose 1975).  The 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) would eventually interpret the law as a 
requirement for all hospitals receiving federal funds to maintain an emergency room and 
participate in Medicare and Medicaid, as well as to provide emergency care and stabilization to 
all comers (Gordon et al. 2001). 
Though promising in concept, the Hill-Burton Act proved impotent by design.  The term 
“emergency” remained undefined, the Department of Health and Human Services was unwilling 
or unable to enforce the act’s mandate, and indigent patients remained largely unaware of their 
right to treatment extended by the law (Lee 2002).  A series of law suits in the 1970s prompted 
HEW to issue new regulations to clarify and strengthen the law, but ultimately failed to make 
substantive changes in hospital practice (Rose 1975).  Finally, congress reacted to an apparent 
glut of hospital beds nationwide in the mid seventies by stopping appropriations for federal 
hospital funding under the act (Rosenbaum and Kamoie 2003).  In light of its policy goal to 
ensure care regardless of ability to pay stated over thirty years prior, by the 1970s the Hill-
Burton Act was a policy failure (Rose 1975). 
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It was not the text or intent of the law that ultimately thwarted its policy goals, but rather 
the regulatory and enforcement processes to which it was subjected. The Hill-Burton Act has 
long since been replaced in the ongoing effort to provide care to those who cannot pay.  Yet the 
Hill-Burton act, understood from a policy process perspective, provides context for the laws that 
followed it and a cautionary tale for those who still seek reform. 
Like more recent examples of reform, the Hill-Burton act was passed not as any one 
stakeholder’s ideal solution, but rather as an amalgam of theoretical compromise and political 
expedience.  The central function of Hill-Burton was to provide funding for the creation of 
private hospitals (Kamoie 2004).  Two conditions were added to the bill in the Senate in 1945, 
one requiring hospitals to provide access to all patients and the other requiring hospitals to 
provide some volume of services to those unable to pay, which made Hill-Burton America’s first 
attempt at providing some degree of universal care (Dowell 1987).  These provisions, referred to 
as the “free service” and “community service” obligations, were added as concessions to Senate 
liberals, whose true ambition was the creation of a national health insurance plan.  As such, they 
represent a compromise designed to provide some degree of coverage for the indigent without 
losing majority support for the bill.  The compromise came with its own limits; there were no 
specific provisions in the law elucidating how the free service and community service 
obligations were to be met (Dowell 1987).   This concern was addressed during Senate hearings 
as specifically as it ever was before the bill’s passage by conservative senator Robert Taft, who 
suggested somewhat abstractly that hospitals be required to provide “some percentage” of 
services to the indigent (Rose 1975).   
The scope of actual reform resulting from hill-Burton would be defined by regulatory 
process and judicial rulings.  HEW was empowered at the federal level to oversee the execution 
55 
 
of the program by individual states, which in turn would be responsible for defining what 
obligations the law imposed and how to meet them.  The Hill-Burton act as passed did not 
include enforcement measures or specific benchmarks for state oversight.  As such, the two 
concessions secured by Senate liberals in an attempt to provide care to the indigent had little 
effect in practical terms (Dowell 1987).  It would be another 25 years before private litigation 
attempted to resuscitate the ineffectual “free service” and “community service” obligations 
seemingly hidden in Hill-Burton (Rose 1975). 
A series of law suits refocused national attention on Hill-Burton and the as yet unresolved 
issue of patient dumping in the early 1970s (Dowell 1987).  Their ultimate effect was to finally 
prompt HEW to issue regulations clarifying the extent of the “free service” and “community 
service” obligations under the law.  The Federal Hospital Council (FHC), which operated within 
HEW to represent the interests of American hospitals, had been given broad authority by Hill-
Burton to approve regulations under the law.  The FHC successfully added two critical 
restrictions to the proposed HEW regulations, including allowing hospitals to simply certify that 
no patient would be turned away from care rather than submit lengthy budget documents 
certifying that a minimum percent of hospital expenditures were going to uncompensated care 
(Rose 1975).  Under this provision, a hospital was under no obligation to provide any set amount 
of uncompensated care.  Though they would not be permitted to turn away an indigent patient, 
hospitals would nevertheless be able to require a cash deposit for services before admitting the 
patient, effectively nullifying the intent of the open door option while still escaping their 
obligation to provide a certain percent of uncompensated care (Dowell 1987).   
Taken at face value, the text of Hill-Burton and its subsequent regulation by HEW seem 
to meet the policy goals of providing some universal care to the indigent.  Senate liberals had 
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secured some degree of expanded health care for the poor in exchange for dropping pursuit of a 
national health insurance policy.  Hospitals eventually secured regulations that limited their 
exposure to uncompensated care while still facing a mandate to provide for the poor.  But 
political interest in Congress was always more aligned with the primary policy goal of funding 
new hospitals than ensuring care for the needy, and this influence persisted through years of 
regulatory reform under the law.  The dissonance between stated policy goals, legal text, and 
actual outcomes seen in the history of the Hill-Burton act are not unique in our political process.  
Nor, as demonstrated by ensuing reforms, is such dissonance immune to repetition. 
 
Round Two: EMTALA 
In 1986, Congress passed the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act.  
Born from the policy heritage of the failed Hill-Burton Act amidst growing public concern for a 
seemingly endless stream of patient dumping horror stories, Congress once again attempted 
incremental reform to ensure universal access to emergency care (Kamoie 2004).  Still tying 
regulation to federal dollars, the proposed EMTALA bill placed two requirements on any 
hospital that participated in Medicare and had an emergency department.  First, any person who 
comes to the emergency department and asks for “…examination or treatment for a medical 
condition…” must be given “an appropriate medical screening examination within the capability 
of the hospital’s emergency department…to determine whether or not an emergency medical 
condition…exists” (42 USC 1395dd).  Then, if such a condition is determined to exist, the 
hospital is obliged to provide “further medical examination and…treatment as may be required 
to stabilize the medical condition” or transfer the patient to another facility, but only if the 
transfer meets strict criteria defined by the law (42 U.S.C 1395dd).  Though tied to Medicare for 
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its regulatory weight, EMTALA in no way allowed hospitals to bill the federal government for 
the care provided under the new regulations.  
 The results of EMTALA, then, would be twofold.  It would create a safety net by putting 
into law the basic moral premise that the poor ought not be left to suffer or die from treatable 
emergent disease in the interest of a hospital’s bottom line.  But it would also create an unfunded 
mandate forcing most hospitals to provide care—often with little hope of compensation—to any 
and all who show up.  Unsurprisingly, hospital administrators greeted the bill with little 
enthusiasm as it worked its way through Congress.  Hospitals railed against the bill, claiming to 
already provide sufficient access without further government regulation (Lee 2002).  A 
burgeoning body of literature, however, suggested otherwise.  Building upon several studies with 
similar findings, Himmelstein, Woolhandler, and Harnly et. al published “Patient Transfers: 
medical practice as social triage” in 1984.  Alluding to the problem of patient dumping, they 
concluded that “…transfer is a common and potentially dangerous medical intervention which 
appears to reinforce racial and class inequalities of access to medical care” (Himmelstein et al. 
1984, 494).  Congress was sold.  The EMTALA safety net, and the unfunded mandate to provide 
it, passed as part of the Consolidated Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1985 (Kamoie 2004).  
 It is difficult to find the beginning of any one policy process, but if one is to be found in 
the case of EMTALA, it is in the definition of patient dumping as formal, persistent problem ripe 
for policy change.  In some sense, the history of Hill-Burton provided a prefabricated problem 
definition: Congress already acknowledged patient dumping as a credible problem seeking a 
policy solution as evidenced by their attempt to solve it in 1946.  Hospital administrators fought 
this assumption as EMTALA was crafted, hoping to redefine patient dumping not as a policy 
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problem, but rather as an inherent condition of the American health care system that was already 
sufficiently addressed by individual action.  
 Borrowing a metaphor from political theorist John Kingdon, the window of opportunity 
for the passage of EMTALA opened despite the objections of private hospitals.  The problem of 
patient dumping was nothing new; the health care system had been dealing with it in some form 
or another since well before the passage of Hill-Burton.  So why, after years of marginal 
regulatory tweaking to the Hill-Burton Act, did Congress pass new legislation in 1986?  Kingdon 
suggests we look for “focusing events,” some turn of affairs that brought patient dumping again 
to the national stage and lead to the passage of EMTALA (Kingdon 1984).   
 Horror stories of patient dumping had begun to circulate in public media.  Seizing the 
moment of interest, Representative Fortney Stark cited a litany of examples on the House floor in 
December, 1985; Senator David Durenberg, among others, weighed in with similar outrage in 
the Senate (Lee 2002).  Personal stories of tragedy capture interest, but are rarely sufficient to 
yield policy change alone; the same can be said for a scientific study or a politician’s 
impassioned plea (Kingdon 1984).  But whispers of tragedy began to color the national mood.  
Declarations of urgency from astute politicians who were ready and able to drive change 
galvanized large segments of the political stream.  Commissioned studies explicitly quantifying 
the magnitude of patient dumping lent seemingly incontrovertible credibility to the problem.   
 The confluence of these events created a unifying symbol of a clear and palpable 
problem: patient dumping.  What for years before had been vague notions of a persistently 
nagging problem became a “crisis.”  Opponents of reform, however genuine or self-serving they 
may have been, were no match for the power of this shared symbol precisely because it made 
clear what most people had already come to believe: patients were being shuffled around to save 
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money, and real people were getting hurt.  The value of a sudden and urgent crisis on the 
National stage is its ability to momentarily align an endless list of partially concordant political 
actors and effect change.  But crisis also begets haste; policy windows are apt to close as quickly 
and unexpectedly as they open, and compromises must be made quickly if change is to happen at 
all.  EMTALA was no exception, and the speed with which the law was assembled is evident in 
its text. 
 EMTALA’s seemingly simple language is belied by ambiguity.  What constitutes 
“appropriate medical screening” is never elucidated in the law itself.  “Emergency condition” is 
defined broadly in the text, leaving little room for doubt regarding the law’s spirit but plenty of 
space to equivocate on its legal implications.  “Stabilization” seems a reasonable goal, but the 
language also requires hospitals to provide the care required to maintain that stability; for how 
long should this requirement be understood to extend?   
 The law’s text, to some extent, was purposefully vague in an attempt to prevent savvy 
hospitals from circumventing its intent (Lee 2002).  This built-in defense mechanism was 
reasonable at the time given the failure of EMTALA’s policy predecessors.  But ambiguity 
yielded unanticipated expansion.  Determinations of these and other uncertainties have come in 
hybrid from published CMS rules and case law precedents over the past 25 years (Bitterman 
2002).  The unintended—though perhaps foreseeable—consequences of EMTALA have 
reshaped the emergency department and health care in the U.S. as whole, in ways well beyond 
achieving the policy goals that created it. 
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Expansion of EMTALA: Regulation and Enforcement 
 Like Hill-Burton, the ultimate effect of EMTALA is a story of post-legislative regulation.  
Though enacted in 1986, implementation guidelines for EMTALA were not issued by the 
Department of Health and Human Services until 1994; they were clarified further in 1998 and 
again in 2003 (Kamoie 2004).  Because in the intervening years hospitals had found ways of 
operating around the intent of the law, it is not surprising nor inappropriate that the DHHS 
guidelines seemed to expand the expectations of an emergency department by explicitly defining 
many of the previously vague terms of EMTALA.   
 Though still subject to political and public review, a bureaucratic agency is able to make 
regulatory changes without the exacting oversight and debate experienced by new legislation as 
it wends its way through Congress.  Freeing the hand of EMTALA to achieve its policy 
objectives in this way may have been as necessary for its function as it was for its passage.  
However, with no obligation to directly appease a constituency, bureaucratic offices run the risk 
of creating unsustainable legal obligations and unrealistic financial burdens—burdens that may 
have been checked by the political process had they been made plain in Congress. 
 Regulations from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) slowly expanded 
the expectations of emergency departments under EMTALA.  CMS’s clarifications on the 
requirements of EMTALA compliance have distinguished the definitions of “stable for transfer” 
from “stable for discharge.”  Patients may be transferred if doing so cannot reasonably be 
expected to cause harm.  Discharge, however, requires the physician to certify that she 
“…reasonably believes that the patient has reached the point where any needed diagnostic test or 
treatment can be performed safely on an outpatient basis…” (Wanerman 2002, 466).  Because 
the uninsured have little hope of securing such an outpatient visit, EMTALA has come to 
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guarantee not only stabilization, but often definitive management as well.  The law also requires 
the ED to employ the full scope of ancillary services at its disposal to effect that care.  The ED is 
expected to provide this care, regardless of cost, or face steep penalties under EMTALA (Lee 
2002). 
 How EMTALA functions in the real world is a product of these DHHS regulatory 
statements, but it is just as much a product of its enforcement.  Enforcement is the joint 
responsibility of CMS and the Office of the Inspector General (OIG).  CMS is charged with 
investigating complaints, and has the authority to prevent a hospital or physician from further 
participating with Medicare—a considerable threat given that most hospitals would be unable to 
sustain themselves without Medicare patients (Wanerman 2002).  The OIG is empowered to levy 
hefty fines for violations; hospitals may be charged up $50,000 per incident.  Individual 
physicians found to be complicit in an EMTALA violation may be fined as much as $50,000 as 
well, and these fines are typically not covered by malpractice insurance (Wanerman 2002). 
 Political theorists have long recognized that “either by design or not, implementers 
sometimes interpret legislative…mandates in a way that authors subsequently argue was not their 
intent” (Kingdon 1984, 102).  That EMTALA has outgrown its policy goal is not a new 
phenomenon; political theorists expect this sort of evolution.  And, despite regulatory 
clarifications, “Some hospitals and physicians express uncertainty about the extent of their 
responsibilities under EMTALA” (US GAO 2001, 3). Combined with a reasonable fear of 
EMTALA’s steep institutional and personal penalties, this uncertainty has translated into a 
significant expansion of the care provided under the EMTALA mandate. 
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The ED, Re-Formed 
The Post-EMTALA Emergency Department 
 Emergency departments have seen a dramatic increase in the number of patient visits, 
from 85 million per year prior to EMTALA to nearly 110 million in 2002—outpacing population 
growth by several percentage points (Bitterman 2002).  Increases in demand without reciprocal 
growth in supply proved financially unsustainable for some.  By 1998, emergency departments 
were closing 27% faster than hospitals in general (Fields et al. 2001).  EMTALA cannot be held 
accountable for escalating demand alone; the growing ranks of the uninsured, cost-evading 
strategies of managed care organizations and Medicaid’s paltry reimbursement rates bear some 
fault. But as their resources dwindled in the face of mounting demand, the responsibilities of 
emergency departments to their growing patient population expanded under EMTALA (Gordon 
et al. 2001). 
 Financial woes aside, EMTALA—and CMS’s interpretation of it—changed the nature of 
care emergency departments are prepared to deliver.  Gone are the days of the emergency room; 
they have been replaced by full-fledged departments, and the moniker “emergency” has become 
something of a misnomer. An ED visit is now the sole contact point with the health care system 
for many of America’s uninsured (Fields et al. 2001).  Necessity bred invention, and the post-
EMTALA emergency department now provides not only disease treatment, but also primary and 
secondary prevention.  It vaccinates our uninsured children.  It detects and manages chronic 
conditions.  It generates practice guidelines for “screening, brief intervention, and referral for 
treatment (SBIRT)” that address the urgent and emergent alike (Bernstein and Haukoos 2008, 
191).   
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 The ED has grown well beyond the law’s mandate; EMTALA has re-formed the ED.  
Once a last resort for the most critically ill, the ED is now the only guaranteed source of 
universal access to care.  First imagined as creating a safety net for emergencies, EMTALA 
ultimately created an ED that functions as a federal safety net for all health care (Fields et al. 
2001). 
 
Blowback: EMTALA’s Fiscal Fallout 
 Care costs money, and the tension between budgets and EMTALA’s unfunded mandate 
has created its own set of policy problems.  At the behest of Congress, the U.S. Government 
Accountability Office issued a report on the effects of EMTALA in 2001.  Their findings were 
encouraging in terms of the law’s initial policy goals; interviews with physician and hospital 
representatives revealed a prevailing belief that EMTALA has successfully ensured access to 
emergency care and stemmed the practice of patient dumping (US GAO 2001).  But the report 
also revealed widespread concerns over increased use of the ED for non-emergent conditions 
leading to waste and increased wait times, confusion among providers about the requirements of 
the law, and a trend among physicians to limit their exposure to EMTALA requirements by 
refusing to take call or dropping hospital privileges altogether (US GAO 2001).   
 Champions of EMTALA policy point to several specific limitations on the care 
emergency departments are expected to provide, ostensibly limiting costs (Lee 2002).  However, 
the practical reality of the complex and fluid policy surrounding EMTALA enforcement has left 
physicians and hospitals fearful of an EMTALA violation, shifting the norm from patient 
dumping to routinely erring on the side of definitive management for all ills (Bitterman 2002).  
Stabilization is always the first step in care, and it is often the only step expressly required by 
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EMTALA provided a plan for securing definitive treatment is in place (Kamoie 2004, 41-60).  
The costs of that definitive management could be left to the patient, in theory.  In practical terms, 
though, leaving the cost of follow-up to an uninsured patient may be tantamount to securing no 
real follow-up at all.  In light of physicians’ requirement to discharge patients only when they 
can be “reasonably expected” to obtain any remaining needed care, physicians are hesitant to risk 
an EMTALA violation by letting the merely stabilized patient go (US GAO 2001).  
 Critics of the state of emergency care balk not at the new roll of the ED as primary care 
provider and access point for the indigent, but rather at the results of creating that roll from an 
unfunded mandate.  Americans without health insurance now turn to emergency departments as a 
primary source of care.  Though not prevented from billing for these services, hospitals rarely 
recoup their costs (Wanerman 2002).  A 1998 National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) 
survey of hospitals suggested that services provided under EMTALA regulations comprised 
about half of uncompensated costs in 1998, generating an $8.35 billion dollar bill for hospitals 
that year alone (Fields et al. 2001).   
 The pecuniary quagmire is compounded by unrealistically low reimbursement rates from 
most state Medicaid programs, as well as managed care organizational rules that allow payments 
to be reduced or denied for care provided without prior authorization—a care-delaying chore 
forbidden by EMTALA (US GAO 2001).  In essence, EMTALA has created a federal health 
care safety net, but done nothing to fund it.  The number of uninsured grew from 29 million in 
1979 (shortly before EMTALA was enacted) to 46.3 million in 2008; federal support for the 
safety net created by EMTALA remains at a stagnant zero dollars (Connors and Gostin 2010).  
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PPACA: Hope for the ED? 
 The greatest source of relief for emergency departments laboring to provide care to the 
uninsured will come from reducing their numbers.  The Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act is poised to do so.  The law mandates insurance coverage for most people by 2014; out-of-
pocket caps and sliding scale subsidies are included in the reform to make this goal possible.  
PPACA removes traditional barriers to private insurance by barring insurers from denying 
coverage for pre-existing conditions.  The law allows children to stay on their parents’ insurance 
up to age 26.  And for those Americans who are still unable to purchase insurance, PPACA 
expands Medicaid eligibility to 133% of the federal poverty level (Connors and Gostin 2010).  
The requirements of EMTALA have not changed, but for the first time since its passage, the 
number of people dependent on it for uncompensated care will start to shrink. 
 Private insurers and Medicaid have created their own problems for emergency 
departments since the passage of EMTALA, and PPACA addresses some of them.  Medicaid 
payments for ED services have generally been too low to meaningfully remunerate hospitals for 
services rendered under EMTALA requirements (Fields et al. 2001).  PPACA standardizes 
Medicaid programs, requiring each state to meet a minimum standard of “essential services,” 
including emergency care.  Private insurers will no longer be able to require prior authorization 
for ED care, closing the loop hole that has allowed them to avoid reimbursement (Connors and 
Gostin 2010).  Emergency departments after health reform will see more insured patients and be 
more able to consistently extract payment for those visits. 
PPACA includes multiple provisions to encourage preventive care and the use of a primary 
care provider.  States will now have the option of creating “health homes” for patients with 
chronic conditions, and the law requires such plans to “establish procedures for referring any 
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eligible individuals with chronic conditions who seek…treatment in a hospital emergency 
department to designated providers” (PPACA Sec 2703).  With greater access to primary care 
reducing the flow of patients into the ED and new requirements for outpatient follow up, PPACA 
could fundamentally change the nature of the emergency department born out of EMTALA. 
Still, it is perhaps best to beware the apparent silver bullet.  Forgetting for the moment the 
political landscape that threatens PPACA’s implementation, CMS’s own actuarial report 
estimates that 23 million people will remain uninsured under the reform (Foster 2010).  Of these, 
the majority will be undocumented workers or people who are eligible for coverage but fail to 
sign up (Katz 2010).  In short, they represent a population with little political sway in a system 
with little inclination to protect them.   
Opposing the policy goals of EMTALA has historically been political, if not moral, folly.  
EMTALA will continue to protect the uninsured, but if they are redefined in the political realm 
as freeloaders rather than every day Americans, they may face an erosion of political support for 
that protection.  Regardless, there will still be 23 million people demanding care under 
EMTALA’s unfunded mandate.  PPACA may drastically change the emergency department, but 
it will not relieve the burden of EMTALA entirely. 
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Conclusion 
 The ED has been remolded by EMTALA into a federal safety net, and the laws of 
EMTALA have not changed.  How the ED will reform itself again under the auspices of PPACA 
remains to be seen.  Medicaid will now have to cover emergency services, but will their 
reimbursement rates for those services could remain untenably low?  Will hospitals continue to 
lose money in the ED to Medicaid patients for providing the care required by EMTALA?  Will 
increasing the numbers of insured patients ease ED crowding or simply fund the primary care 
provided there?  Is care provided to illegal immigrants destined to remain an unrecoverable 
expense for the ED?  The effects of past reforms have been defined as much by their 
implementation as the policy goals inherent in their text.  PPACA will likely prove no different 
in this respect, and it may be years before its full effect on the American emergency department 
is realized.  
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